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Nondiscrimination Under Federal
Grants-Striving Toward Equal Employment
Opportunities for Handicapped Individuals
An assumption underlying the concept of prejudice toward the disabled is that where two persons apply for a job, and are equal in all
characteristics except for the presence of a disability of one of them,
the nondisabled person will be hired in preference to the disabled.'
I.

THE REHABILITATION

ACT

OF

1973

History is replete with manifestations of discrimination against
handicapped individuals.2 Employment opportunity is one major
aspect of society in which the handicapped individual is often the
target of discriminatory practices. 3 Such treatment is premised
upon the erroneous assumption that employing handicapped persons will hinder production and escalate workmen's compensation
rates.'
Congress, in recognition of the approximately thirty-five million Americans with mental and physical disabilities, has expressed
its intent to assure that handicapped persons gain independence
and dignity through initiating policies which will extend equal employment opportunities to those individuals.' Notwithstanding this
1. Rickard, Triandis, & Patterson, Indices of Employer Prejudice Toward Disabled
Applicants, 47 J. APPLIED PSYCH 52 (1963).
This study focuses on the results of a survey which empirically supported the assumption
that the disabled are rejected more strongly than the nondisabled in employment opportunities. Furthermore, the strength of the prejudice was found to vary among different types of
disabilities. "Employers are more prejudiced toward the epiletic and persons discharged from
prison than toward the person discharged from a turberculosis sanatorium. Persons discharged from a mental hospital, the deaf, and persons confined to a wheelchair fall in between." Id. at 54.
2. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons As A "Suspect Class" Under The Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
barred from
CLARA LAW. 855, 861-70 (1975). "Individuals with handicaps are all too often ...
employment or are underemployed because of archaic attitudes and laws." S. REP. No. 1297,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6400.
3. "The disabled face three problems in finding employment: outright refusal by employers to hire them; self-doubts created by prejudice; and rigid physical examinations, the
validity of which is accepted by employers without question." Note, Equal Employment and
the Disabled: A Proposal, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 457, 457-58 (1974) (footnotes omitted)
[hereinafter cited as Equal Employment].
4. See, e.g., Equal Employment, supra note 3, at 458; Note, Potluck Protections for
Handicapped Discriminatees:The Need to Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discriminationon
the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CHI. L.J. 814, 816-25 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Potluck
Protections].
5. See White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 701
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expression of congressional concern, proposals to amend Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19646 to include the handicapped as a class
protected from discrimination in private employment have never
gained sufficient support for passage. 7
(Supp. V 1975) [hereinafter cited as White House Conference].
The Congress finds that"(1) the United States has achieved great and satisfying success in making
possible a better quality of life for a large and increasing percentage of our
population;
"(2) the benefits and fundamental rights of this society are often denied those
individuals with mental and physical handicaps;
"(3) there are seven million children and at least twenty-eight million adults
with mental or physical handicaps;
"(4) it is of critical importance to this Nation that equality of opportunity,
equal access to all aspects of society and equal rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States be provided to all individuals with handicaps;
"(5) the primary responsibility for meeting the challenge and problems of
individuals with handicaps has often fallen on the individual or his family;
"(6) it is essential that recommendations be made to assure that all individuals with handicaps are able to live their lives independently and with dignity,
and that the complete integration of all individuals with handicaps into normal
community living, working, and service pattterns be held as the final objective;
and
"(7) all levels of Government must necessarily share responsibility for developing opportunities for individuals with handicaps;
and it is therefore the policy of the Congress that the Federal Government-work jointly
with the States and their citizens to develop recommendations and plans for action in
solving the multifold problems facing individuals with handicaps.
Id. Cf. 119 Cong. Rec. 24442 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (present estimates ranging from
28 million to over 50 million).
"No one knows exactly how many handicapped citizens there are in the United States.
Estimates range from all low as 11 million to more than 50 million, depending on the definition of 'handicapped' and the age limits." Hamer, Rights of the Handicapped, in EDITORIAL
RESEARCH REPORTS 885, 887 (1974). "The difficulty in obtaining accurate and meaningful
statistics is attributable to the inability of statisticians to measure the effect of a defined
handicap on the capacity of the handicapped to function normally in society." Note, A broad
In The Land: Legal Strategies To Effectuate The Rights Of The Physically Disabled, 61 GEO.
L.J. 1501, 1501 n.2 (1973).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. IV
1974).
7. For an exhaustive list of the proposed amendments to Title VII to cover handicapped
individuals, see Wright, Equal Treatment Of The HandicappedBy Federal Contractors, 26
EMORY L.J. 65, 65 n.2 (1977); Potluck Protections, supra note 4, at 835 n.133.
One possible explanation for the failure of these proposed amendments to muster sufficient support for passage is an attitude shaped by callous economic philosophy.
If we are not prepared to put to work every person who is willing and able to work,
then I don't think we will ever put to work those who may, for some reason or another,
appear to have some type of handicap. . ..
The basic question is that we don't seem to want to employ people, we want to
restrict the contributions of people on the theory that we cannot expand too fast, that
it is inflationary, that it is too costly, et cetera.
With that type of policy or attitude, it just worries me how are we ever going to
get around to ending discrimination in all of its manifestations, on the theory that
there are not enough jobs.
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Title VII and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment' guarantee equal employment opportunities and treatment to minorities and women. At present, however, both Title VII
and the equal protection clause inexorably deny the expansion of
similar protections to handicapped individuals. Title VII attacks
only private employment practices and treatment which discriminates on the basis of an "individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 9 Handicapped individuals are excluded as a class
from Title VII's statutory protections prohibiting discrimination in
private employment.
With respect to the equal protection clause, unless the alleged
unequal treatment impinges upon a fundamental interest or is
based on a suspect classification, such discriminatory treatment
must only withstand a "rational relationship" test, as opposed to
the more stringent "compelling state interest" test.10 Classifications
Oversight Hearings on FederalEnforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity Laws Before
the Sunbcomm. on Equal Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Hawkins).
Another possible reason why the proposed amendments were never enacted is reflected
by the view that handicapped persons require individual and distinct treatment in order to
be afforded equal opportunity in employment.
Section 504, however, differs conceptually from both title VI and IX. The premise
of both title VI and title IX is that there are no inherent differences or inequalities
between the general public and the persons protected by these statutes and, therefore,
there should be no differential treatment in the administration of Federal programs.
The concept of section 504, on the other hand, is far more complex. Handicapped
persons may require different treatment in order to be afforded equal access to federally assisted programs and activities, and identical treatment may, in fact, constitute
discrimination. The problem of establishing general rules as to when different treatment is prohibited or required is compounded by the diversity of existing handicaps
and the differing degree to which particular persons may be affected. Thus, under
section 504, questions arise as to when different treatment of handicapped persons
should be considered improper and when it should be required.
41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1976) (letter from former HEW Secretary Mathews (May 11, 1976)).
Race and sex are generally discernible factors unrelated to job qualifications. Physical
and mental disabilities, however, are frequently undiscernible and their degree is
relevant to whether or not an applicant may be employable and in what capacity.
Therefore, compliance activities under this statute and these Regulations, including
the conduct of complaint investigations, must be individualized to a far greater degree
than in a program where the sole factor limiting the complainant's employability may
be something as irrelevant as race or gender.
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6431, 6434 (letter from Richard F.Schubert for Secretary of Labor to the Honorable Harrison A. Williams, Chairman, Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare (Sept. 24, 1974)).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in relevant portion that: "No state shall ..
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
10. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,82 HARv.L. REv. 1065 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
A third level of analysis has recently emerged out of the Court's traditional two-tiered
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based on mental or physical disabilities are unlikely to be viewed
with the degree of suspectedness which has traditionally triggered
strict scrutiny requiring a demonstration of some "compelling state
interest."" Although the Court has previously viewed the right to
employment as an economic touchstone for all fundamental interests, 2 it has analyzed employment discrimination on the basis of the
"rational relationship" standard absent a showing of discrimination
against a suspect class. 3 Since the handicapped are not viewed as
a suspect class, governmental employment classifications which discriminate on the basis of mental or physical disabilities are likely
to be judicially analyzed under the "rational relationship" standard. 4 Unequal treatment has easily withstood the "rational relationship" test where the classification is based "upon a state of facts
that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy."'" Insofar as mental or physical disabilities
equal protection methodology. For an incisive discussion of this third level of equal protection
analysis, or what has been termed "intermediate scrutiny," see L. TmBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-31 (1978).
11. In Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd on other grounds,
556 F. 2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1977), the district court stated in dicta that:
[T]he plaintiff's claim that the blind constitute a "suspect classification" is insupportable. Even admitting that the blind are a small, politically weak minority that has
been subjected to varying forms of prejudice and discrimination, the limitations placed
on a person's ability by a handicap such as blindness cannot be ignored. Unlike distinctions based on race or religion, classifications based on blindness often can be justified
by the different abilities of the blind and the sighted.
Id. at 992 n.8.
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), the plurality implicitly distinguished handicaps from sex as grounds for unequal treatment in employment: "[Wihat
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, aligns
it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that sex characteristic frequently bears no relation
to ability to perform or contribute to society."
12. "In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor his liberty is restricted, his
capacity to earn wages and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied the protection which
the law affords those who are permitted to work." Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630, 636 (1914).
But see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). "This Court's
decisions give no support to the proposition that a right of governmental employment per se
is fundamental." Id. at 313.
13. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
However, intermediate scrutiny may be triggered where: (1) important, though not necessarily fundamental, interests are at stake, or (2) sensitive, though not necessarily suspect,
classifications are constructed. See L. TIBE, supra note 10, at § 16-31.
14. See Equal Protection,supra note 10.
15. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959). The Court on occasion may even
hypothesize some legitimate state interest the legislators may have had in mind. In Goesaret
v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948), the Court hypothesized that a Michigan law forbidding
any female to act as a bartender, unless she was the wife or the daughter of the male owner,
may have been legislated out of the belief that "oversight assured through ownership of a bar
by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid." Furthermore, under the rational relationship test, the state's classification is presumed to be constitutional. McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
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may directly affect one's capability to perform a certain job, unequal treatment premised on the facts of such disabilities may easily
be held to reasonably constitute distinctions or differences in state
policy.
Thus, the handicapped individual's constitutional claim to obtain redress for unequal treatment in governmental state policies is
tenuous at best 6 and the exclusion of handicapped individuals from
the language of Title VII precludes any extention of similar statuprotections afforded minorities and women
tory equal employment
7
under that Title.
The Rehabilitation Act of 19731s was enacted into law on September 26, 1973 for the declared purpose of providing vocational
rehabilitation services to handicapped individuals and promoting
and expanding employment opportunities for such individuals in
9
the public and private sectors. The Act replaced the Vocational
16. This is not to say that a strong equal protection argument attacking discriminatory
employment policies directed against handicapped individuals cannot be constructed. See
Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification, 83 YALE L. REv. 1239 (1974). Furthermore, state
policies which discriminate against handicapped individuals may be challenged on the
grounds that they create an irrebuttable presumption and violate the due process clause. See
note 53 infra.
17. There are, however, many states that have legislated fair employment laws prohibiting discrimination against handicapped individuals. See Potluck Protections,supra note 4
at 835-36. "Thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and New York City now prohibit
discrimination against the handicapped." Wright, supra note 7, at 65 n.1.
The scope of these state statutory protections is severly restricted insofar as many contain exceptions focusing on disability as a classification to justify discrimination. To the
extent that the focus is on disability, as opposed to capacity, these exceptions reflect the type
of prejudice which the disabled are often faced with and must combat. See Equal Employment, supra note 3, at 462.
18. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701-794 (Supp. V. 1975)).
19. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a statutory basis for the Rehabilitation Services Administration, and to authorize programs to(1) develop and implement comprehensive and continuing State plans for meeting
the current and future needs for providing vocational rehabilitation services to handicapped individuals and to provide such services for the benefit of such individuals,
serving first those with the most severe handicaps, so that they may prepare for and
engage in gainful employment;
(8) promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and private sectors
for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in employment;
29 U.S.C. §§ 701(1) & 701(8) (Supp. V 1975).
Further reference to the congressional intent behind the Rehabilitation Act may be found
in S. REP. No. 318, 93 Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2076, 2092.
The key to the intent of the Committee's belief that the basic vocational rehabilitation program must not only continue to serve more individuals, but must place more
emphasis on rehabilitating individuals with more severe handicaps. It is the bill's
intent to be more responsive to the needs of the handicapped individual by providing
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Rehabilitation Act 2 despite such obstacles as a presidential pocket
veto and the inability of the Senate to override a subsequent veto.2 '
In light of the inadequacies of the equal protection clause and Title
VII, the Rehabilitation Act is a long awaited legislative enactment
guaranteeing equal opportunity to handicapped individuals seeking
employment with federal contractors22 or in programs or activities
receiving federal financial assistance.23 Although the Rehabilitation
Act's protections against employment discrimination restrict only
those employers under federal contract or receiving federal financial
assistance, it is estimated that the Act will affect more than 275,000
companies and institutions employing over one-third of the coun24
try's work force.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 2 5 prohibits discriminatory
treatment of otherwise qualified handicapped individuals in any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. This comment will focus on the probable impact of section 504 on the discriminatory employment practices facing handicapped individuals.2 " Although the import of the Rehabilitation Act's general thrust
to develop and provide vocational rehabilitational services to handicapped individuals cannot be overestimated, this comment will
operate upon the assumption that the Act's effectiveness in assuring
"that all individuals with handicaps are able to live their lives independently and with dignity ' 28 stands in a direct relationship with
the handicapped individual's success in attaining equal employment opportunity under the nondiscrimination mandate contained
in section 504.2 Indeed, if there exists a situation more distressing
a better basic program of service as well as an emphasis within special project authority for target populations whose needs are not now being met within the basic program.
Additionally, the Committee has added provisions designed to focus research and
training activities on making employment and participation in society more feasible
for handicapped individuals.
Id.
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 31-42 (Supp. III 1973). See S.REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 25,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 6373, 6376.
21. S. REP. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2076, 2087-90.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (Supp. V 1975).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
24. Lublin, Lowering Barriers, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
26. See notes 2-4 and accompanying text supra.
27. See note 19 supra.
28. White House Conference, supra note 5, § 301(6).
29. "The ultimate goal of most handicapped persons is to take an equal place in society.
This means winning the right to full employment and to equitable pay alongside their ablebodied peers." Hamer, supra note 5, at 893.
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than an individual burdened with a mental or physical handicap,
it is the plight of a person who has been vocationally rehabilitated,
or whose disabilities are unrelated to a specific job description, and
is nonetheless discriminated against in an employment opportunity
for which he is otherwise qualified.
II.

ENDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HANDICAPPED
INDIVIDUALS

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197330 "is the first Federal civil rights. law protecting the rights of handicapped persons
and reflects a national commitment to end discrimination on the
basis of handicap. ' ' 31 Thus, section 504 "breaks new legislative
ground ' 3 by providing that:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States,
as defined in section 706(6) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his
any program or activhandicap, be subjected to discrimination under
3
ity receiving Federal financial assistance.
Comparative employment data demonstrates not only that section 504 "breaks new legislative ground," but that it is also a drasti,ally needed statutory protection affording equal employment opportunities to handicapped persons. Only forty-two percent of this
country's handicapped individuals, as opposed to fifty-nine percent
3
of the total population, are gainfully employed4. This disparity is
magnified by the fact that more than half of those handicapped
persons who are employed earned less than $2,000 in 1969.11 Unless
the handicapped are given the opportunity to rebut presumptions
of inferiority with respect to the job they are otherwise capable of
performing, the stigma of inferiority will certainly continue and
become self-perpetuating.36 The regulations implementing section
3
504, consistent with the expressed intent of Congress,' define and
prohibit acts of discrimination against qualified handicapped indi30. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
31. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary, Dept. of
Health, Education, and Welfare (April 28, 1977)).
32. 41 Fed. Reg. 20,296 (1977) (letter from former HEW Secretary Mathews (May 11,
1976)).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
34.

Hamer, supra note 5, at 888.

35. Id.
36. "If one who can perform does not receive an opportunity to do so and kill the
stereotype, the image becomes self-perpetuating." Note, Developments in the LawEmployment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV.
1109, 1179-1180 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments-Title VIII.
37. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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viduals in employment opportunities. 8 Section 504 provides a statutory vehicle through which the handicapped individual can rise to
a higher degree of visibility in society, educate the nation, and erode
the presumption of inferiority.39
There are three issues central to the handicapped individual's
success in attaining equal employment opportunity through section
504: (1) who may claim protection under that section; (2) the existence of an affirmative duty and the availability of a private right of
action; and (3) the standard which will be applied to test for discriminatory employment practices.
III.

CLAIMING PROTECTION UNDER SECTION

504

Initially, section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act defined the term
"handicapped individual" as any individual who "(A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or
results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided pursuant to titles I and III of
this Act." 4 Congress anticipated that this definition might erro38. HEW Nondiscrimination On The Basis Of Handicap In Programs Or Activities
Receiving Or Benefiting From Federal Financial Assistance, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977) (to
be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 84). These regulations were promulgated in compliance with EXEC.
ORDER No. 11,914 § 2, 3 C.F.R. 117, 118 (1977). "The regulation defines and forbids acts of
discrimination against qualified handicapped persons in employment. . . . As employers,
recipients must make reasonable accommodation to the handicaps of applicants and employers unless the accommodation would cause the employer undue hardship." 42 Fed. Reg.
22,676 (1977) (summary).
The Secretary of HEW is directecd to "establish standards for determining who are
handicapped individuals and guidelines for determining what are discriminatory practices,
within the meaning of section 504." EXEC. ORDER No. 11,914 § 1, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977). Furthermore, "[t]he Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall coordinate the implementation of section 504 . . .by all Federal departments and agencies." Id. In compliance with
this executive order HEW has promulgated a coordinating regulation requiring that the
regulations promulgated by each agency to implement section 504 be consistent with the
guidelines contained therein. HEW Implementation of Executive Order 11914, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Federally Assisted Programs, 42 Fed. Reg. 2,132 (1978)
(to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 85).
39. See Hamer, supra note 5, at 901.
ALMOST EVERY AMERICAN knows someone who is handicapped, whether friend,
relative or acquaintance, and few people oppose the concept of equal rights for the
disabled. But general indifference and unthinking discrimination are the rule. However, there are indications that matters are changing, primarily as a result of the higher
visibility of handicapped citizens throughout the nation. "We've found that most of
the problems resulted from ignorance," said Eric Gentille of the Civic Presence Group.
"Once people are aware, they are glad to make the necessary changes. It's an educational problem, not a revolutionary one."
Id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. III 1973), amended 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975).
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neously indicate that the test of discrimination should focus on
whether the individual could reasonably be expected to benefit from
vocational rehabilitation services in terms of employment, or
whether the individual's disability is a handicap to employment.',
Accordingly, the definition was altered by the Rehabilitation Act
Amendments of 197442 because "[s]ection 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped persons, regardless of
their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation
41. Section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 defines "handicapped individual." That definition has proven to be troublesome in its application to provisions of
the Act such as sections 503 and 504 because of its orientation toward employment and
its relation to vocational rehabilitation services. It was clearly the intent of the Congress in adopting section 503 (affirmative action) and section 504 (nondiscrimination)
that the term "handicapped individual" in those sections was not to be narrowly
limited to employment (in the case of section 504) nor to the individual's potential
benefit from vocational rehabilitation services under titles I and III (in the case of both
sections 503 and 504) of the Act.
Thus, it was not intended that an employer-government contractor should condition its hiring of handicapped individuals under an affirmative action plan on such
individuals' having benefited, or having a reasonable expectation of benefiting from
vocational rehabilitation services. Similarly, a test of discrimination against a handicapped individual under section 504 should not be couched either in terms of whether
such individual's disability is a handicap to employment, or whether such individual
can reasonably be expected to benefit, in terms of employment from vocational rehabilitation services. Such a test is irrelevant to the many forms of potential discrimination covered by section 504.
Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from vocational rehabilitation
services, in relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing, transportation,
education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs. Examples of handicapped individuals who may suffer discrimination in the receipt of Federally-assisted
services but who may have been unintentionally excluded from the protection of section 504 by the references to enhanced employability in section 7(6) are as follows:
physically or mentally handicapped children who may be denied admission to
Federally-supported school systems on the basis of their handicap; handicapped persons who may be denied admission to Federally-assisted nursing homes on the basis
of their handicap; those persons whose handicap is so severe that employment is not
feasible but who may be denied the benefits of a wide range of Federal programs; and
those persons whose vocational rehabilitation is complete but who may nevertheless
be discriminated against in certain Federally-assisted activities.
In order to embody this underlying intent, section 111(a) of the Senate amendment to H.R. 14225 added a new definition of "handicapped individual."
S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd. Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 6373, 6388-89.
42. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 87 Stat. 1617 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 5108(c)(10) to 5108(c)(12) (Supp. V 1975); 20 U.S.C. § 107 note to 107e (Supp.
V 1975); 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 note to 792(h) (Supp. V 1975)).
43. See note 41 supra. "With this amended definition, it became clear that section 504
was intended to forbid discrimination against all handicapped individuals, regardless of their
need for or ability to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services." 42 Fed. Reg 22,676
(1977) (letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare (April 28, 1977)).
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services. 4 3 In order to statutorily clarify the purpose of section 504,
the following sentence was added to the definition of handicapped
individual:
.For the purposes of subchapters IV and V of this chapter, such term
means any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment
which limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has
a record of such
impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an
4
impairment.

Unlike the attempt to carefully define the scope of handicapped
individual," neither the language of section 504 nor the legislative
intent behind the Rehabilitation Act shed any light on the exact
meaning which should be given to the term "otherwise qualified."
In the context of employment, however, the regulations promulgated under section 504 define "qualified handicapped person" as
"a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential function in question."" This regulatory construction of "qualified" focuses on the capabilities of the handicapped person seeking employment, as measured against the demands of the specific position in question. The regulations also
require that the employer take reasonable steps to accommodate the
capabilities of the handicapped individual with respect to the de47
mands of the position sought.
Two recent district court decisions, both preceeding the effective date of the regulations promulgated under section 504,48 construed "otherwise qualified" similarly to the definition announced
in the regulations. In Davis v. Southeastern Community College"
44. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. V 1975). This definition has also been incorporated in
the regulations promulgated under section 504. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (to be codified in 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)).
45. Although section 7(6) statutorily defines the term handicapped individual for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, it is likely that the administrative agencies and courts will
encounter the same difficulties in determining who is handicapped as have arisen in disability
cases under the Social Security Act. See Wright, supra note 7, at 72; Liebman, The Definition
of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security Income: Drawing the Bounds of
Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARv. L. REV. 833 (1976). See generally Comment, Defining the
Handicapped: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 3 U. DAY. L. REV. 391 (1978).
46. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (1977) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1)).
47. "A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation
of its program." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a)). See note
55 infra for illustrative examples of reasonable accommodation contained in the regulations.
48. The final HEW regulations promulgated under section 504 were effectuated on June
3, 1977.
49. 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976). The plaintiff argued that section 504 precludes
Southeastern Community College from refusing her admission into a nursing program on the
basis of a hearing disability. Id. at 1345. The court found no violation, however, as the
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the court construed "otherwise qualified" as meaning "otherwise
able to function in the position sought in spite of the handicap, if
proper training and facilities are suitable and available." 0 As in the
regulations, the Davis construction centers on the capability of the
handicapped individual and the demands of the position sought. 51
Furthermore, the Davis court's references to the availability of suitable training and facilities parallels the "reasonable accommodation" requirement contained in the regulations. 2
Likewise, the district court in Gurmankin v. Costanzo5 advanced a similar construction of "otherwise qualified." The court,
acknowledging that section 504 protects only "otherwise qualified"
handicapped individuals, viewed that requisite condition as
"clearly requir[ing] a nondiscriminatory evaluation of. . .competency." 5 4 The requirement of competency stressed by the Gurmankin. court is consistent with the definition of "qualified handicapped person" provided in the regulations insofar as the question
of competency necessitates an examination of the capabilities of
the handicapped person and the demands of the position sought.
The only substantive difference between the regulations and the
Gurmankin decision is that the regulations require that reasonable
accommodation be taken into account in examining the capabilities
of the handicapped individual.55

plaintiff failed "to establish her ability to complete the program." Id.at 1346.
. 50. Id. at 1345. See note 46 and accompanying text supra for the regulation's definition
and its similarity to the Davis construction.
51. In Davis, however, the court determined that the plaintiff's hearing disability affected her capability to perform in such a manner as to render her not otherwise qualified in
light of the training and position she sought to enter. "The major problem with plaintiff's
contention is that her handicap actually prevents her from safely performing in both her
training program and her proposed profession." 424 F. Supp. at 1345.
52. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.13(a)). See note 47 supra
for text of that section of the regulations.
53. 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977).
The plaintiff, a blind woman, alleged that the Philadelphia School District's hiring practices
discriminated against visually handicapped persons and violated, inter alia, section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act. On appeal, the court held that "refusals by the District to permit her
to take the examination violated due process by subjecting Ms. Gurmankin to an irrebuttable
presumption that her blindness made her incompetent to teach sighted students." 556 F.2d
at 187.
54. 411 F. Supp. at 992 (emphasis added). "In this regard the special problems encountered by blind teachers certainly must be considered, but the fact that several hundred blind
persons are successful teachers indicates that . . . blindness does not automatically prevent
• . .[one] from being 'otherwise qualified.' " Id.
55. See note 47 supra. Also, a "recipient may not deny any employment opportunity
to a qualified handicapped employee or applicant if the basis for the denial is the need to
make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental limitations of the employee or
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The regulations" and relevant case law57 require a determination that the disability, given reasonable accommodations, does not
prevent a handicapped individual who is otherwise qualified from
performing in the position sought. If relief is to be obtained under
section 504, the handicapped individual must demonstrate that he
or she is able to perform, or would be able to perform if reasonable
accommodations were provided, and, therefore, is otherwise as qualified as her or his able-bodied peers for the job in question. 58 The
absence of proof of disqualification due to a physical or mental
disability does not in itself establish a handicapped individual's
qualification to function in the position sought, 59 nor is disability for
one job necessarily a disability for another.'"
Even where the claimant seeking relief under section 504 is an
"otherwise qualified handicapped individual," an inquiry must be
conducted to ascertain whether the employer is a recipient of federal
financial assistance and therefore falls within the purview of that
section. Section 504 does not prohibit discriminatory employment
practices against all qualified handicapped individuals. It applies
only to the employment practices of recipients of federal financial
assistance.2 Given the fact that section 504 is viewed as closely
tracking section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,62 the contention
may be made that section 504 applies only to the employment practices of recipients of federal financial assistance where the primary
objective of such assistance is to provide employment. 3 However,
applicant." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(d)). The regulations
illustrate that: "Reasonable accommodation may include: (1) making facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, and (2) job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,
the provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions." Id. (to be codified in 45
C.F.R. § 84.12(b)).
56. "No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, be subject to
discrimination in employment.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.11(a)). See note 55 supra.
57. See notes 50 & 54 and accompanying text supra.
58. Wright, supra note 7, at 71. For example, the Davis court concluded that plaintiff's
hearing disability "actually prevented her from safely performing in both her training program and her proposed profession." 424 F. Supp. at 1345. See note 51 supra.
59. Wright, supra note 7, at 71.
60. Id. at 71 n.24.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1974).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. IV 1974). In Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth. 548 F.2d
1277 (7th Cir. 1977), the court pointed out that section 504 "closely tracks" section 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1280. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39,
reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390. "Section 504 was patterned
after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ..
" Id.
63. "Section 604 of Title VI stated clearly that the title was not intended to apply to
the employment practices of the recipients of federal assistance except where the primary
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"
the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act, legislative his7
"
tory, " regulations," and judicial acquiescence, establish that a
more encompassing interpretation should be given to section 504. It
is clear that section 504 applies to the employment practices of "any
public or private agency, institution, organization, or other entity,
or any other person to which federal financial assistance is extended
directly or through another recipient," regardless of the purpose for
"9
which such assistance was made available.
supra
objective of the federal assistance was to provide employment." Equal Employment,
the
of
604
section
tracks"
"closely
also
504
section
Since
note 3, at 467 (footnotes omitted).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, it may be argued that section 504's applicability to employment
practices should be similarly restricted.
64. Unlike Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 504 contains no language
for which the
restricting its applicability to employment practices on the basis of the purpose
3, at 467.
note
supra
Employment,
Equal
federal financial assistance was extended. See
65. "Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped indieducaviduals . . . in relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing, transportation,
(emphasis
tion, health services, or any other Federally funded programs." See note 41 supra
added).
on the basis
66. The regulations provide that: "No qualified handicapped person shall,
or activprogram
any
under
employment
in
discrimination
to
of handicap, be subjected
" 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)). The regulations
ity ..
of the
do not qualify the nondiscrimination mandate in employment practices on the basis
purpose for which the federal financial assistance was received, or any other criteria.
in which
67. One case, however, was dismissed on the grounds that the job category
or
the plaintiff was allegedly discriminated against was not contained within a program
Dept., 14
activity receiving federal financial assistance. Simon v. St. Louis County Police
7703 (E.D. Mo. May 2, 1977).
EMPL. PRAc. DEc. (CCH)
has
In an attempt to bring the defendants within the coverage of the Act plaintiff
comthe
However,
aid.
federal
of
recipient
a
is
alleged that the Police Department
plaint does not allege that plaintiff was denied all employment by the Department,
but, rather, that defendants refused to rehire him to his position within the Departparament as a commissioned police officer "with reasonable accommodations for his
plegia." In this situation plaintiff must allege that the particular job category in which
he was allegedly discriminated against was a program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance.
504 had
Id. at 5441 (footnote omitted). Acknowledging that the regulations under section
to
recently been promulgated, the court qualified its holding by advising the parties
"ascertain the pertinency of the regulations." Id. at 5442 n.1. It is important to note that even
assistance
the Simon court did not go so far as to hold that the purpose of the federal financial
discriminary
from
protection
seek
successfully
to
is
one
if
employment,
must be to provide
employemployment practices under section 504. Section 504 claims, alleging discriminatory
the
which
purpose
the
for
concern
without
examined
judicially
been
have
ment practices,
of Tampa, 430
federal financial assistance was extended in the following cases: Duran v. City
809 (E.D.
F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp.
grounds,
other
on
aff'd
1976),
Pa.
(E.D.
982
Pa. 1977); Gurmankin v. Constanzo, 411 F. Supp.
Health Services
556 F. 2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth
Corp., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 11,500 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976).
68. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f)).
change
69. See note 65 supra. "In ... defining federal financial assistance, a clarifying
Department has
has been made: procurement contracts are specifically excluded . . . The
has been
never considered such contracts to be contracts of assistance; the explicit exemption
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Lloyd v.

Regional TransportationAuthority
The threshold determinants to the availability of relief under
section 504 include status as an otherwise qualified handicapped
individual and discriminatory treatment by a recipient of federal
financial assistance. 0 No less crucial to the effectiveness of section
504 in ending employment discrimination against handicapped individuals is the establishment of an affirmative duty on the part of
employers and a private right of action. One need only look to the
number of companies and institutions affected by the Rehabilitation Act 7 and the disparity in terms of the rates of employment
which exist between handicapped individuals and the rest of the
country's population in general 2 to comprehend the importance of
an affirmative duty and a private right of action. The private right
of action is often viewed as the most effective tool in enforcing
statutory prohibitions."3 Affirmative duty, on the other hand, is a
remedial tool utilized to end the competitive disadvantage minorities are often faced with in employment opportunities.74 Achieving
a nondiscrimination objective may in fact necessitate affirmative
duty requirements." 5
added only to avoid possible confusion." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685 (1977) (to be codified
at 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(h) (app. a)).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1974). See notes 40-69 and accompanying text
supra.
71. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
72. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
73. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private enforcement
of
statutory prohibitions necessary supplement to administrative action).
74. "Affirmative action reflects a desire to avoid putting minority group members
at a
disadvantage because of characteristics that make them a minority." Note, Affirmative
Action Toward Hiring Handicapped Individuals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 795
n.48 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Affirmative Action]. It "evolves from a purely remedial concept,
though
predominantly remedial but slightly continuing phase, into a full-fledged
continuingobligation concept." Id. at 803.
75. See Affirmative Action, note 74 supra, at 800 n.77.
Once the boundaries of permissible job requirements are delineated, there remains
the important question of how the employer can apply them. Is it enough for him
to
be a passive applier of fair requirements, or must he actively seek out minorities
on
whom to apply his standards? An employer can maintain a relatively segregated
work
force by means other than discriminatory selection criteria. He may target virtually
all of his recruitment effort at whites. Or he may do no active recruiting, hiring
exclusively on a walkin bias. This, also, can have a signficantly adverse impact on minority
employment. After he has developed a consistent record for discrimination
over a
period of years, his reputation becomes known. Minorities spread word on the
employer's basis. Other potential applicants, afraid of similar rebuffs, do not bother
to
apply. Consequently, the employer is left with a pool of applicants who have heard
of
vacancies by word of mouth from present . . .[able-bodied] workers. The question
is whether the employer with a taste for discrimination can benignly rely on this inertia
to maintain a predominantly . . .[able-bodied] work force.
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Congressional intent and the regulations promulgated under
section 504 endorse the requirement of an affirmative duty. The
manifest intent behind section 504 is that it not only prohibits discrimination, but that it also includes a requirement of affirmative
action."6 Furthermore, the regulations state that aid, benefit, or
services provided to handicapped persons must be as effective as
those provided to others." Employers are required to take positive
steps to hire and advance in employment qualified handicapped
persons in programs assisted under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975.8 This is not to say, however, that the
affirmative duty of an employer does not extend beyond programs
receiving assistance under the Handicapped Children Act. The regulations further require that the recipient of federal financial assistance make "reasonable accommodation" for the limitations of a
qualified handicapped applicant or employee."
The Seventh and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have judicially acknowledged an affirmative duty on the part of recipients of
federal financial assistance. In Lloyd v. Regional Transportation
Authority'" the court held that "[s]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, at least when considered with the regulations which now imple8
ment it, establishes affirmative rights." ' In addition to the consideration given to section 504's companion regulations, the underlying
rationale applied in the Lloyd decision relied extensively on the
2
Supreme Court's holding in Lau v. Nichols." In Lau, a unanimous
Court held that the failure of a public school system to provide
adequate language instruction to students of foreign ancestry vioDevelopments-Title VII, note 36 supra, at 1152-53. The specific scope of action required on
duty may
the part of an employer under an affirmative duty is not well defined. Affirmative
to the
according
case
each
in
different
"something
be viewed as a fluid concept meaning
peculiar nature of the particular kind of discrimination." Affirmative Action, note 74 supra,
at 801 n.81.
76. "Where applicable, section 504 is intended to include a requirement of affirmative
2d Sess.
action as well as a prohibition against discrimination." S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong.,
of former HEW
39, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6390. See Letter
Secretary Mathews note 7 supra.
or
77. (1) A recipient, in providing any aid benefit, or service, may not, directly
through contractual, licensing or other arrangements, on the basis of handicap;
(iii) Provide a qualified handicapped person with an aid, benefit, or service that is
not as effective as that provided to others.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b) & (b) (iii)).
78. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232 to 1401 (Supp. V 1975)).
79. See notes 47 & 55 supra.
80. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
81. 548 F.2d at 1281.
82. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3:2

lated section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.83 The Lloyd court,
observing that section 601 of the Civil Rights Act "closely tracks"
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,8 4 relied on Lau as dispositive
as to the issue whether an affirmative duty exists under section
504.85 The Eighth Circuit, in United Handicapped Federation v.
Andre," explicitly endorsed the Lloyd decision and held that section
504 creates an affirmative duty on the part of recipients of federal
financial assistance. 7
There are two arguments militating for a narrow reading of the
Lloyd and Andre decisions with respect to the existence of affirmative duty under section 504. First, both Lloyd and Andre8 rely on
the Lau decision. In Lau, two Justices, expressing concern that the
decision may be interpreted too broadly, concurred on the grounds
of the number of plaintiffs adversely affected.89 Therefore, it may be
argued that the existence of an affirmative duty under section 504
is somehow dependent on the number of handicapped individuals
who are being adversely affected by the alleged discriminatory employment practices. The strength of this argument is mitigated by
the 504 regulations prohibiting any denial of equal employment
opportunity based on the need to make reasonable accommodations." Furthermore, not only does the legislative intent indicate
that section 504 includes a requirement of affirmative duty,' but
also the goal of equal employment opportunity for handicapped
83. "Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely
by
providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum;
for students
who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful
education."
Id. at 566.
84. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
85. "Because of the near identity of language in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act
of 1973 and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Lau is dispositive." 548 F.2d
at 1281.
86. 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
87. "We adhere to the reasoning ...
in the Lloyd appeal, and find that section 504
does create an affirmative duty..." Id. at 415.
88. Although the Andre decision does not specifically cite Lau as precedential
support,
the Andre court admittedly adhered to the analysis in Lloyd. See note 87 supra.
The Lloyd
decision relied extensively on the holding in Lau. See note 85 supra.
89. Against the possibility that the Court's judgement may be interpreted
too
broadly, I stress the fact that the children with whom we are concerned here number
about 1,800. This is a very substantial group that is being deprived ....
I merely wish to make plain that when, in another case, we are concerned with a
very few youngsters, or with just a single child . . .I would not regard today's decision,
or the separate concurrence, as conclusive upon the issue whether the statute and
the
guidelines require . . .[affirmative action].
414 U.S. at 571-72 (concurring opinion of J. Blackmun with C.J. Burger joining).
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be cited in 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(d)). For the text
of this
regulation see notes 47 & 55 supra.
91. See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
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persons may in fact necessitate such a duty." The concern expressed
in Lau may more accurately be the extent of action required by
affirmative duty,93 as opposed to whether such a duty exists.
Second, insofar as the Lloyd and Andre decisions dealt with the
inaccessibility of mass transportation systems to mobility-disabled
persons, it may be argued that the finding of affirmative duty in
these decisions should not be extended to equal employment opportunity. Such an argument, however, fails to take into account the
rationale behind Lau and the regulations promulgated under section 504. The rationale applied in the Lau decision centered on the
assumption that identical treatment does not always achieve equality of opportunity. 4 Likewise, the regulations acknowledge the fact
that equal opportunity may require different or special treatment
of handicapped persons" and that such different or special treatment manifests itself in the form of reasonable accommodation in
the area of employment. Both the Lau rationale and the regulations may be interpreted as necessitating the existence of an affirmative duty to remedy the alarming disparity in rates of employment
and wages between handicapped individuals and their able-bodied
peers. 7
Although there is no explicit creation of a private right of action
within the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act, judicial
interpretation has established its existence within the context of
section 504.11 In Cort v. Ash," the Supreme Court has recently an92. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
93. See Affirmative Action, note 75 supra.
94. 414 U.S. at 566. For pertinent section of the text see note 83 supra.
95. "In drafting a regulation to prohibit ... discrimination, it became clear that different or special treatment of handicapped persons, because of their handicaps, may be necessary in a number of contexts in order to ensure equal opportunity." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977)
(letter from Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare
(April 28, 1977)).
96. See notes 47 & 55 supra.
97. See notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text supra.
98. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth. (7th Cir. 1977); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977); Kampmeier v.
Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C.
1977); Bartel v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen.
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Duram v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D.
Fla. 1977); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Kruse v. Campell,
431 F. Supp. 180 (E.D. Va. 1977); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W.Va. 1977);
Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1977); Vanko v.
Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Halerman et al. v. Pennhurst State School and
Hospital et al., No. 74-1345 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180
11,500 (D.
(S.D.W. Va. 1976). Contra, Coleman v. Darden, 13 EMPL. PtAc. DEC. (CCH)
Colo. 1977).
"Several comments urged that the regulations incorporate provision granting beneficiar-
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nounced a four prong test for determining whether a statute may be
properly construed as authorizing an implicit private right of action.
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First is the
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted, "-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor
of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? 01
In Lloyd, the court applied the Cort test to the issue whether
a
private right of action was implicit in section 504 and concluded
that "a private cause of action must be implied from Section 504.""0,
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and several district courts
have
also construed section 504 as "implicitly providing for a private
right of action."' 0 2
The Lloyd court held that the mobility-handicapped persons
impeded by transportation barriers "are among the class specially
benefitted by the enactment of [section 504]" and that the
first
prong of the Cort test was satisfied. o3 This conclusion was
based
upon an examination of the legislative history behind the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974.' o4 The same legislative history
also
indicates that handicapped persons discriminated against in
employment opportunities are among the class specifically benefited
by section 504.10
ies a private right of action against recipients under section
504. To confer such a right is
beyond the authority of the executive branch of government.
There is, however, case law
holding that such a right exists." 42 Fed. Reg. 22,687 (1977) (to
be codified in 45 C.F.R. (app.
a.8) (citations omitted).
99. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
100. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
101. 548 F.2d at 1285 (emphasis added). See United Handicapped
Fed'n v. Andre, 558
F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977).
102. 548 F.2d at 1287. See note 98 supra.
103. 548 F.2d at 1285.
104. "Indeed one of the principal purposes of the 1974 Rehabilitation
Act Amendments
was to include within Section 504 individuals who may have
been unintentionally excluded
from its protection by the original definition of handicapped
individuals which overemphasized employability." Id. at 1285 n.25. See note 41
supra. For the significance of
subsequent enactments in establishing the intent of an earlier
statute see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). "Subsequent legislation
declaring the intent of an
earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory analysis."
Id. at 380-81 (footnotes
omitted).
105. See note 41 supra. In Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp.,
428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.
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Realizing that the "legislative history of Section 504 is bereft
of much explanation," the court viewed the legislative history of the
in
Rehabilitation Act Amendments as having cogent significance
as
504
section
construing the original congressional intent behind
06 The Lloyd court
required by the second prong of the Cort test.
opined that the congressional intent behind section 504, as illuminated by the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments, "contemplates judicial review of an administrative proceeding as contradistinct from an independent cause of action in federal
courts."'' 7 The court went on, however, to clarify that "it is plain
at
that the rights of the handicapped were meant to be enforced
and
action,"',"
of
cause
private
a
of
some point through the vehicle
an
that "under the second prong of the Cort test, there is surely
to
none
and
indication of legislative intent to create such a remedy
judideny it."' ° The distinction made by the Lloyd court between
cial review of an administrative proceeding and an independent
for the doccause of action may have arisen out of consideration
administrative
of
trines of primary jurisdiction" and exhaustion
remedies."' Notwithstanding the existence of a private right of acemployment discrimiPa. 1977), a handicapped plaintiff instituted'a cause of action alleging
handicapped,"
nation in violation of section 504. "That persons with epilepsy are considered
815.
at
Id.
contested."
be
to
self-evident
too
"is
court,
the
observed
See note 104 supra.
106. 548 F.2d at 1285.
Amendments
107. 548 F.2d at 1286. The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act
judicial rema
"permit[s]
504
section
of
implementation
the
specifically acknowledges that
40, reprinted in [19741
edy through a private action." S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd. Cong., 2d Sess.
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6391.
108. 548 F.2d 1285.
109. Id. See note 107 supra.
or the
110. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction determines whether the court
decision.
initial
the
make
should
agency
in
The precise function of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court
after
determining whether the court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until
in the
an administrative agency has determined some aspect of some question arising
proceeding before the court.
A determination by a court that an agency has primary jurisdiction does not mean
that the
that the court will refrain from deciding the case before it; it may mean only
a
court will postpone its action on the case before it until after the agency has made
determination.
designated
omitted).
3 K. DAvis ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 19.01, at 2-3 (1958) (footnote
review of
judicial
of
timing
the
with
concerned
is
doctrine
exhaustion
The
111.
jurisprimary
of
doctrine
the
from
distinguishable
administrative action. It is clearly
take
diction, which guides a court in determining whether a court or an agency should
sought
relief
substantive
the
grant
cannot
it
that
holds
initial action. When a court
the
because only an agency has jurisdiction to grant such relief, the court is applying
administraof
stage
what
at
determines
court
a
When
jurisdiction.
doctrine of primary
tive action judicial review may be sought, the court is either applying the requirement
may
of ripeness, the broad doctrine that governs the kinds of functions that courts
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tion, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion also affect
the availability of the judicial forum for a claim for relief."l
2
In applying the third prong of the Cort test, the Lloyd court
held that an implicit private right of action "is certainly consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme.""' The
court
also determined that the fourth prong of the Cort test was
satisfied
as "[a]ffording a private remedy under Secton 504 . . .would
not
be the kind of suit traditionally relegated to state law in
an area
basically the concern of the States.""'
The Lloyd holding that section 504 implicitly provides for
a
private right of action may arguably be viewed as a narrow
one
insofar as the court left "open as premature the question whether,
after consolidated procedural enforcement regulations are issued
to
implement Section 504, the judicial remedy available must
be limited to a post-administrative remedy.""'5 More accurately, however,
the Lloyd decision and application of the Cort test firmly establish
an implicit private right of action" 6 which is subject to: (1)
a determination of whether the court or an agency should make the
initial
decision under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,"' and
(2) the
timing of the judicial action under the doctrine of exhaustion." '
V.

INVIDIOUS MOTIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT:
STANDARDS FOR
SCRUTINIZING UNEQUAL TREATMENT

The regulations extend section 504's nondiscrimination mandate to a wide range of employment activities" 9 providing that:
"No
perform, or the relatively narrow doctrine of exhaustion, which
focuses not upon the
functions of courts but merely upon the completion or lack
of completion of administrative action.
Id. at § 20.01, at 57.
112. See notes 110 & ll supra.
113. 548 F.2d at 1286.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1286 n.29. The court went on in dicta to state that
"assuming a meaningful
administrative mechanism, the private cause of action under
Section 504 should be limited
to a posteriori judicial review." Id.
116. It is recognized in the appendix to the regulations promulgated
under section 504
that the Lloyd decision holds that a private right of action
does exist. See note 98 supra.
117. See note 110 supra.
118. See note 111 supra.
119. (b) Specific activities. The provisions of this subpart
apply to:
(1) Recruitment, advertising, and the processing of applications
for employment;
(2) Hiring, upgrading, promotion, award of tenure, demotion,
transfer, layoff, termination, right of return from layoff, and rehiring;
(3) Rates of pay or any other form of compensation and changes
in compensation;
(4) Job assignments, job classifications, organizational structures,
position descriptions, lines of progression, and changes in compensation;
(5) Leaves of absence, sick leave, or any other leave;
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of handicap, be
qualified handicapped person shall, on the ' basis
2°
subjected to discrimination in employment.'

There are no exact-

ing standards present in the 504 regulations or the Rehabilitation
Act, however, from which specific employment practices can be

scrutinized. 2' What the regulations do provide are general guiding

principles mapping out the contours of discriminatory actions in
violation of section 504. Aids, benefits, and services provided by
recipients of federal financial assistance are not required to yield an
identical level of achievement for handicapped persons and their
able-bodied peers, but must provide handicapped persons an equal
(6) Fringe benefits available by virtue of employment, whether or not administered
by the recipient;
profes(7) Selection and financial support for training, including apprenticeship,
for leaves of
sional meetings, conferences, and other related activities, and selection
absence to pursue training;
and
(8) Employer sponsored activities, including social or recreational programs;
(9) Any other term, condition, or privilege of employment.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(b)-(b)(9)).
The Fair Labor Standards Act provides in part that:
the SecreExcept as otherwise provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection,
opportunities
tary of Labor, to the extent necessary in order to prevent curtailment of
under special
for employment, shall by regulation or order provide for the employment
whose earncertificates of individuals (including individuals employed in agriculture)
or injury,
deficiency
mental
or
physical
or
age
by
impaired
is
capacity
ing or productive
of this
206
section
under
applicable
wage
at wages which are lower than the minimum
with
title but not less than 50 per centum of such wage and which are commensurate
same
the
essentially
for
vicinity
the
in
industry
in
those paid nonhandicapped workers
type, quality, and quantity of work.
the payment of
29 U.S.C. § 214(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). This statute permits and encourages
with section 504
lower wages to handicapped workers and on its face appears to be in conflict
It is argued that section
of the Rehabilitation Act and section 84.11(b)(3) of the regulations.
Act to "allow differenStandards
Labor
504 should be interpreted consistently with the Fair
76.
at
7,
note
supra
Wright,
workers."
handicapped
for
tial wages
handicapped indiThe equal protection mandate of section 504 is triggered only by the
supra. Where a
vidual who is otherwise qualified. See notes 45-58 and accompanying text
there is no
description,
job
particular
a
for
qualified
handicapped individual is otherwise
equal to
sound reason why such an individual should not receive wages and compensation
Labor
Fair
the
under
paid
be
may
wages
lower
hand,
other
the
his able-bodied peers. On
"whose earning or
Standards Act where a handicapped person is not otherwise qualified and
29 U.S.C. §
productivity capacity is impaired by . . . physical or mental deficiency."
the Fair
and
504
section
of
applicability
214(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis added). The
former requires
the
exclusive;
mutually
are
compensation
and
wages
to
Act
Labor Standards
requires impaired capaca handicapped individual to be otherwise qualified, while the latter
neither is section 504 in
Therefore,
deficiency.
physical
or
mental
some
of
result
the
as
ity
be interpreted to allow
504
section
should
nor
Act,
conflict with the Fair Labor Standards
discriminatory wage scales for otherwise qualified handicapped employees.
120. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)).
aff'd on other
121. In Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
that a refusal
clear
"reasonably
it
view
did
court
the
1977),
Cir.
(3rd
grounds, 556 F.2d 184
which . . . section [504]
to hire a blind person as a teacher is the kind of discrimination
was meant to prohibit."
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opportunity to secure the same result or level of achievement.122
Within the context of employment practices, a "recipient may not

participate in a contractual or other relationship that has the effect
of subjecting qualified handicapped applicants or employees to dis-

crimination. "123

In general, one of three standards has traditionally been applied by the courts in discrimination cases.14 Under the Court's
current methodology, in cases arising under the equal protection
clause, the plaintiff has the burden to establish that "invidious
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor ' ' 2 behind the challenged conduct. The Title VII standard, in light of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,' 28 condemns conduct which produces discriminatory effects, regardless of motive.'1 The final standard is judicial review
of administrative actions limited to determining "whether there is
substantial evidence to support the

.

.

.

agency's decision.

'

2 This

standard of review is applied where the administrative agency has
made the initial determination which is then appealed through the
2
courts. 1
122. For purposes of this part, aids, benefits, and services, to be equally effective,
are not required to produce the identical result or level of achievement for handicapped
persons but must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain
the same
result, to gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement, in
the most
integrated setting appropriate to the person's needs.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,679 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(2)).
123. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.11(a)(4)).
"The relationships referred to in this subparagraph include relationships with employment
and referral
agencies, with labor unions, with organizations providing or administering fringe
benefits to
employees of the recipient, and with organizations providing training and
apprenticeship
programs." Id.
124. See Wright, supra note 7, at 72-74.
125. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266
(1977). See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Washington
v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976).
126. 401 U.S. 424'(1971).
The Supreme Court used the [Washington v. Davis] case to announce the proposition
that under the Fourteenth Amendment and related statutes, the "effect test"
of Griggs
did not apply. This is not a surprising conclusion. It was one that could be
drawn by
looking at the opinions of Justice Burger the year that Griggs was decided. In
contrast
to the expansive interpretation of Title VII in Griggs was the careful and
cautious
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Certainly the processes of democracy
are
strengthened by the courts when they liberally construe a statute which has
been
recently passed and recently reconfirmed by the Congress instead of exercising
their
own judgment under the Constitution. Title VII rights are far stronger for being
based
on contemporary legislation than if they rested solely on the opinions of the
Supreme
Court.
Blumrosen, Developments in Equal Opportunity Law, 36 FED. B.J. 55, 63 (1977).
127. See Wright, supra note 7, at 73; Blumrosen, supra note 126, at 63.
128. Jones v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (social
security
disability claim).
129. See Wright, supra note 7, at 74.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss2/8

19781

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

In a section 504 claim initially instituted before a court, the
choice of standards for scrutinizing alleged discriminatory treatment centers on the equal protection motive test' and the Title VII
effect test. 3 ' The motive test imposes a particularly harsh and unrealistic burden on the claimant.' If it cannot be shown that the
employer's conduct was solely motivated by some discriminatory
purpose, the burden of proof merely shifts to the employer to establish "that the same decision would have resulted even had the im' 3
permissible purpose not been considered."' Under this standard,
cases of mixed motive will likely be resolved against the handicapped claimant."' The fact that most instances of discrimination
35
against handicapped persons arise out of benign motives,' as opposed to the invidious discriminatory purpose which is a prerequisite for relief under the Court's current equal protection methodology, 3' demonstrates that the motive test is completely unsatisfactory in the context of achieving equal employment opportunity for
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals.
While section 504 prohibits discrimination "solely by reason of
• . .handicap,"' 37 the regulations provide that: "No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap, . . . be subject to
discrimination.' ' 3 The omission of the word "solely" from section
504's companion regulations is an occurrence ripe to spawn litigation. A cursory reading of section 504 may result in the conclusion
that the use of the phrase "solely by reason of. . . handicap" compels an application of the motive test in employment discrimination
claims arising under section 504.11 At least superficially, the lan130. See note 125 supra.
131. See note 126 supra.
Desegregation
132. See Note, Wright v. Rockefeller And Legislative Gerrymanders:The
Decisions Plus A Problem Of Proof, 72 YALE L.J. 1041, 1059 (1963).
Davis is
The burden imposed on plaintiffs to show the kind of intent required by
that
proof
by
met
even
not
is
It
effects.
or
not met by proof of foreseeable consequences
acts. Nothing
the . . .[recipients] are aware of the disproportionale impact of their
will justify a
short of a showing of deliberate, purposeful, systematic discrimination
finding of a . . . violation.
in Northern
Comment, From Denver to Dayton: The Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine
"the style
School Desegregation Litigation, 3 U. DAY. L. REV. 115, 129 (1978). Furthermore,
impossible
almost
an
with
one
presented
it
that
was
decision
Heights]
of . . .[the Arlington
not one's intent."
task of not only determining what was one's intent, but also what also was
(Supp. LI 1977).
188
187,
SOCIETY
ARISTOTEUAN
THE
Intention,
Re
In
Quinn,
and
Crawford
133. 429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
134. See Wright supra note 7, at 81.
135. See Hamer, supra note 5, at 901.
136. See note 124 and accompanying text supra.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975).
138. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (1977) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(a)).
compel an
139. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975). Such a reading would erroneously
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guage used in section 504 parallels the Court's current equal protection methodology.' A more incisive analysis of the Rehabilitation
Act and the 504 regulations, however, conclusively establishes
the
Title VII effect test as the correct standard to apply in
discrimination claims arising under section 504.
One of the declared congressional purposes behind the Rehabilitation Act is to "promote and expand employment opportunities
in
the public and private sectors for handicapped individuals."'
Given the fact that discrimination against handicapped
persons
generally originates out of benign motives, requiring an
application
of the motive test in claims of employment discrimination
would
emasculate section 504's nondiscrimination mandate. The
motive
test would render section 504 useless verbiage in guaranteeing
"that
equality of opportunity . . . be provided to all individuals
with
handicaps," '42 as it is unlikely that many handicapped
claimants
could meet the harsh and unrealistic burden imposed
on them
43
under that test.
It is at least arguable that the phrase "solely on the basis of...
handicap" was intended to accent the fact that unequal
treatment
based on an inability to perform due to a disability does
not constitute discrimination.'" That is to say the "solely" is descriptive
not
of the motive behind the recipient's conduct, but of the status
of the
handicapped individual. Specific support for this construction
can
be found in the regulations governing employment practices
which
provide that recipients "may not limit, segregate, or classify
applicants or employees in any way that adversely affects their
opportunities or status because of handicap.,,145 For example, where
a disability affects an individual's capability to perform in a specific
job
description to such an extent as to make that individual
unqualified
for the position, an employer's refusal to hire would not
have been
based "solely" on the individual's status as handicapped.
The refusal to hire was the result of the handicapped individual's
incapability of fulfilling the demands of the job in question. 46 On
the other
application of the motive test in all discrimination claims
arising under section 504.
140. See notes 125 & 133 and accompanying text supra.
141. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (Supp. V 1975). See note 21 and
accompanying text supra.
142. White House Conference, supra note 5, at § 301(4).
143. See notes 132 & 133 and accompanying text supra.
144. The legislative history behind the Rehabilitation
Act is bereft of any explicit
explanation. See Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548
F.2d 1277, 1285 (1977).
145. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.11(a)(3)) (emphasis
added).
146. For example, a blind person would certainly not
be capable of fulfilling the demands of a job as a bus driver.
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hand, where a disability is unrelated to the demands of the position
sought' 4 7 an employer's refusal to hire may be argued as based
"solely" on that individual's status as handicapped.
Construing the phrase "solely by reason of . . .handicap" as
descriptive of status promotes the stated goals behind the Rehabilitation Act'48 and warrants an application of the Title VII effect
test.' 9 The effect test would require the otherwise qualified handicapped claimant to show only that the recipient's employment practices were discriminatory in effect and would relieve the claimant
from the unrealistically harsh burden of proving invidious discriminatory purpose. Application of the effect test would also be consistent with the regulations insofar as they prohibit activities "that
have the effect of subjecting qualified handicapped persons to discrimination on the basis of handicap."' 5 Finally, the democratic
processes are not eroded when the courts liberally construe a recently enacted statute, as opposed to judicially extending the protections of the equal protection clause.' 5'
VI.

CONCLUSION

To a large extent, the judicial process will determine whether
the Rehabilitation Act's command to extend equality of opportunity
in employment to the otherwise qualified handicapped individuals
in our society will ring hollow or succeed in fully developing our
nation's human resources. A liberal scope of application, the establishment of an affirmative duty and a private right of action, and
adoption of the Title VII effect test to scrutinize unequal treatment
are among the tools which can assure that handicapped individuals
attain equal employment opportunity under the nondiscrimination
mandate contained in section 504. There is perhaps nothing more
fundamental to the goal of living independently and with dignity
than the ability to secure equality of opportunity in employment;
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is the first statutory enactment
that can provide a legal avenue for handicapped individuals to create equal employment opportunities and to achieve that goal.
Much of the prejudice against handicapped persons in employ147. The relatedness of the particular disability must be determined along with any
"reasonable accommodation" the employer may make. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,680 (1977) (to be
codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a)).
148. See notes 5 & 19 supra.
149. See note 126 and accompanying text supra.
150. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,678 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(6)(1)) (emphasis
added).
151. See Blumrosen, supra note 126.
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ment opportunities arises out of ignorance. The central problem,
therefore, is one to be resolved through a process of education.
Opening the judicial forum to handicapped claimants seeking relief
under section 504 from discriminatory employment practices is per
haps the most direct means to sensitize our nation to the waste of
human resources occurring in the employment sector of society
Judicially fostering an ascent to higher levels of visibility places the
handicapped individual in a strong tactical position to educate the
nation, erode the stigma and presumption of inferiority and end the
plight of the vocationally rehabilitated and those with disabilities
unrelated to a specific job description who are discriminated against
in an employment opportunity for which they are otherwise qualified.
In the final analysis, it will be the federal courts that determine
whether section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is an evanescent statement of altruistic social policy or an efficacious statutory enactment
guaranteeing the benefits and fundamental rights of this society to
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals.
Garry W O'Donnell
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